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TIME: Almanac 1993
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TIME Almanac 1993.iso
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1992-08-28
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WORLD, Page 26THE GULFAre We Ready to Wage War?
Not by the Jan. 15 deadline, says an all-too-candid U.S. general
By LISA BEYER -- Reported by Dean Fischer/Dubai and Bruce van
Voorst/Washington
If anyone but Lieut. General Calvin A.H. Waller had been
responsible, the blooper would have had "disinformation" written
all over it. After all, it would be advantageous for Washington
to lull Saddam Hussein into a false sense of security. And what
better way than to have the deputy commander of American forces
in the gulf tell a group of reporters that the U.S. would not
be ready to attack come Jan. 15, the deadline that the U.N. has
given Iraq to pull out of Kuwait?
But it was Waller who blurted out that unexpected assessment
last week, and for those who know him, it was altogether
plausible that this was a simple case of a guileless Army man
putting his boot in his mouth. "He's a hell of a good soldier,"
said a friend of Waller's, "but that doesn't make him a
competent spokesman."
Other colleagues were less generous. "Stupid," said a fellow
officer of Waller's remarks. "Absolutely imbecilic," said
another. Soldiers are not supposed to tell such secrets to the
enemy. In truth, what Waller said should come as no surprise to
anyone who has been tracking the progress of American deployment
in the gulf. That he said it, however, was a shocker. Waller's
indiscretion signaled to Saddam that the Rubicon may not be
crossed on Jan. 15, thereby undercutting Washington's effort to
scare him out of Kuwait without a fight.
It may prove, of course, to have been a false message -- the
Bush Administration may opt for a swift war after all. But now
that a senior officer has made headlines with his reservations,
the political risks of such a move have been multiplied. Should
a mid-January offensive bring high casualties, President Bush
would stand accused of sending U.S. soldiers into battle
unprepared, something he has repeatedly promised the American
people he will not do.
Waller's conclusion that not all U.S. forces will not be set
to go until perhaps the middle of February proceeds from some
rather basic arithmetic. By last week the U.S. had 280,000
troops in the gulf theater. An additional 150,000 are scheduled
to join them. But because the military's transportation systems
are overloaded, some ground forces now in Europe and the U.S.
are not due in Saudi Arabia until late January. Even if all of
them were in place by the U.N.'s cutoff date, it would take two
or three weeks to acclimatize the new arrivals.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had conceded before Waller
piped up that not all the troops would be "combat ready" by
mid-January. But Cheney did not suggest that this should force
a postponement of any offensive; Waller did.
Administration officials quickly scrambled to undo the
effects of Waller's candor. Secretary of State James Baker
claimed that the general's comments were intended to keep Saddam
guessing. Countered a U.N. diplomat: "When an official states
publicly that something is disinformation, that's when you know
it is not." Meanwhile, White House press secretary Marlin
Fitzwater told reporters that "what [Waller] really said is they
might not be as ready as they would like to be."
In fact, that was not what Waller said, but perhaps he
should have. Like any prudent general, Waller was being super
cautious. "The military services never tell you they've got
enough," says a senior admiral. "They always want just a few
more."
But do they really need more -- more time, more troops, more
planes? Many military experts say no. Virtually every realistic
strike plan calls for an intensive air bombardment before any
ground troops advance. By all accounts, the air forces in the
region are lined up and ready to go. The forward thrust on the
ground might not begin for days or even weeks, giving the foot
soldiers additional time to crank up.
The Pentagon must also weigh the hazards of waiting. One
concern is troop morale, which was not helped last week by the
capsizing off Haifa of an Israeli boat carrying American sailors
from shore leave to their ship. At least 19 seamen drowned.
Another worry is that given a breather, Saddam would improve his
field communications and strengthen his supply lines, currently
the weak links in Iraq's defenses.
More time might also mean more opportunities for the Desert
Shield coalition to fray and more chances of another flare-up
in Israel's occupied territories that would strain ties between
the U.S. and its Arab allies. Last week the U.S. repaired some
of the damage caused by the Temple Mount killings in Jerusalem
in October by voting with the rest of the U.N. Security Council
for a resolution criticizing Israel's management of the
territories and calling for U.N. monitoring of the Palestinians'
safety there. In a separate statement, the council endorsed an
international peace conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
There has never been anything magical about Jan. 15 per se.
Establishing a credible deadline, however, did have the merit
of conveying to Saddam that his choices were only two: "move it
or lose it," to quote Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Though no one has said 12:01 a.m. Jan. 16 is the
moment of reckoning, President Bush has done his best to give
that impression. The U.N. resolutions against Iraq, he said,
should be enforced "right on schedule." Bush underscored the
idea by rejecting Baghdad's proposed date of Jan. 12 for a
meeting between Baker and Saddam. Washington says that would not
allow enough time for Iraq to withdraw before Jan. 15. Attempts
to schedule that meeting and a visit to Washington by Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz remained stalled last week.
Whatever day the Administration may have in mind for an
attack, the best hope for averting war is to convince Saddam
Hussein that D-day is coming -- before it arrives. But the Iraqi
President has given no sign that he is coming to that
conclusion. Last week's high-level contradictions won't help him
see the light.